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BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA
DR. SHUFAN SUNG*
ABSTRACT
It is no hyperbole to say that climate change is one of the most urgent
crises all humans face together. Among the many ways that governments
have attempted to curb carbon emissions, border tax adjustments (BTAs)
have majorly aimed to restore the competitiveness of developed coun-
tries with more stringent carbon control policies. This article carefully
examines the proposal under the tests of international environmental
laws to evaluate the implications of BTAs in international legal system.
The article argues that the imposition of BTAs will be inconsistent with
set principles of the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR),
sustainable development and polluter pays and cause environmental in-
justice due to the adaptation and vulnerability of developing countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
More consecutive days with high temperature, frequent drought and
flooding in different areas simultaneously, the concerned record cold
winter with more storms, increased risk of food insecurity in some coun-
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tries and the outspent public budget for assisting the conditions1 are some
of the emerging phenomena that have made the negotiation for a post-
Kyoto climate regime imperative and as urgent as it can be. Following
the framework under the Kyoto Protocol, most industrialized countries2
have come up with carbon control policies and therefore, have borne
higher carbon prices.3
To avoid carbon leakage4 and restore the fairness of competition, devel-
oped countries have proposed unilateral border tax adjustments (BTAs)
on goods manufactured in or services associated with developing coun-
tries. Theoretically, BTAs might sound as a fair way to curb climate
change based on carbon intensity. However, the complexity and uncer-
tainty have drawn keen discussions as to whether it will increase or de-
crease trade transparency and competitiveness of developed countries.
Conventional analysis has primarily reviewed this important policy ques-
tion through the lens of economic policy analysis or the legality under
the WTO. Some researchers argue that BTAs are required for economic
efficiency in carbon abatement.5 Others consider that such a proposal
would be a nuclear option in terms of trade consequences and not so
effective in reducing global emissions.67 There is also abundant discus-
1. According to The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), annual federal climate
spending has increased from $4.6 billion in 2003 to $8.8 billion in 2010, amounting to $106.7 billion
over that period. The money was spent in four general categories: technology to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, science to understand climate changes, international assistance for developing coun-
tries, and wildlife adaptation to respond to actual or expected changes. See Larry Bell, The Alarming
Cost of Climate Change Hysteria, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/
2011/08/23/the-alarming-cost-of-climate-change-hysteria/.
2. Industrialized countries refer to the Annex I Parties listed under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), https://
unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php.
3. See Nicholas Herbert Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2007).
4. Carbon leakage is defined as “the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking
domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.” Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, at 665 (2007), avail-
able at https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html.
5. See, e.g., Raymond J. Kopp & William A. Pizer, Assessing US Climate Policy Options
Resources for the Future (2007), available at http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Documents/
CPF_COMPLETE_REPORT.pdf. See also Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjust-
ment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading,“ 24 European J. L. & Econ. 137
(2007).
6. See Aditya Matto et al., Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy (Ctr. For Global
Development, Working Paper No. 189, 2009), http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/
1423204 (“Our estimates show that imposing tariffs across-the-board based on the carbon content of
imports would address competitiveness concerns of domestic producers and contribute to further
emissions reductions. But it would be a ‘nuclear option’ in terms of trade consequences.”).
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sion on whether the proposal is compatible with existing WTO trade
rules.89
However, the implementation problems inherent to the proposal do not
only involve the competitiveness in the trade policies of developed coun-
tries. More importantly, it concerns the interests and welfare of develop-
ing countries, which remain the most vulnerable due to natural
disasters10 and implications from current international environmental
law. Few articles that have addressed BTAs have attempted to theorize
the ways in which international environmental law should play an impor-
tant role in assessing BTAs.
By examining why and how BTAs would influence developing coun-
tries, this article seeks to offer insight into a number of broader ongoing
debates, including implications in international environmental law, re-
sponses from developing countries,11 legal development12 and environ-
mental injustice in China.13 Specifically, the imposition of BTAs
impedes the concepts well-developed in international environmental
law14 of the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) princi-
ple, the state responsibility principle and the polluter pays principle, by
causing disharmony of international environmental law. This article also
analyzes the important reasons opposing the practice of BTAs through
7. Niven Winchester et al., Will Border Carbon Adjustments Work?, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANALY-
SIS & POL’Y (2011) (“For 2025, we find that BCAs reduce leakage by up to two-thirds, but result in
only modest reductions in global emissions and significantly reduce welfare. In contrast, BCA-
equivalent leakage reductions can be achieved by very small emission charges or efficiency im-
provements in nations targeted by [border carbon adjustments] (BCAs), which have negligible wel-
fare effects. We conclude that BCAs are a costly method to reduce leakage, but may be an effective
coercion strategy.”).
8. See, e.g., Timothy E. Deal, WTO Rules and Procedures and Their Implication for the
Kyoto Protocol, (2008), https://uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
International Trade Law and International Environmental Law: Environmental Taxes and Border
Tax Adjustment in WTO Law and EC Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMU-
NITY 127-55, (Richard L. Revesz ed., 2000).
9. For example, the WTO issue on border tax adjustments relates to the National Treatment
Principle set in Article III of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS. WTO, Principles
of the Trading System, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.
10. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Climate
Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries, 5 (2007), http://unfccc
.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf.
11. See infra Part II for a discussion of responses from officials of China and India regarding
the EU tax on aviation.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.D.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
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the test of adaptation capacity,15 and the continuing efforts made by de-
veloping countries and environmental justice.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II sets forth a background narra-
tion of the proposal for BTAs. Part III examines the most solid proposal
with the case of the European Union’s (EU) attempted tax on aviation as
an example. Part IV turns to the central thesis of this article, offering an
explanation for why BTAs might not be an ideal tool in curbing climate
change.
First, BTAs are supposed to encourage voluntary reduction, not impose
mandatory penalties under the CBDR principle.16 Also, the state respon-
sibility principle is not triggered under the Kyoto Protocol for developing
countries. Second, developing countries are the most vulnerable to cli-
mate change impacts due to lack of resources.17 Under the concept of
sustainability development, limited resources should be distributed to de-
veloping countries in priority to assist adaptation and mitigation work,
instead of being reallocated to developed countries through BTAs.18
Third, some developing countries, such as China, have invested signifi-
cantly in green industries and set noticeable national targets in reducing
energy intensity per unit of GDP. China, in particular, has set a national
target of reducing its energy intensity per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% by
2020, compared to 2005 levels.19 It corresponds to the principles of
CBDR and polluter pays. In 2013, alone, China had once again invested
more than the U.S. and other industrialized countries in renewable en-
ergy industries.20 It seems unjustified to impose BTAs against develop-
ing countries for the efforts in cutting emissions. Last, under the
consideration of environmental justice, the adoption of BTAs will lead to
welfare losses of low-income people in both developing and developed
countries, resulting in an increased unemployment rate in developing
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See DUNCAN BRACK, MICHAEL GRUBB & CRAIG WINDRAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 163 (Earthscan 2000); John Hontelez, Time to Tax Carbon Dodgers,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6524331.stm; THE PEW
CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, Beyond Kyoto: Advancing The International Effort Against
Climate Change (2003), http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/BeyondKy-
oto.pdf.
17. See UNFCCC, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Hai Chen, Stricter Regulations Required to Reap Benefits from China’s Green Investments
New Report Highlights Country’s Leading Role in Renewable Energy, UNEP NEWS CENTER (Nov.
26, 2013), http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2755&ArticleID=9713&l=
en us (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
20. Lan Lan, Renewable Get China A Push, CHINA DAILY, Jun. 5, 2014.
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countries and further obstacles against transitioning towards a sustainable
society.21 Since public participation is still limited in China, it is tough to
meaningfully involve the affected communities and have their opinions
be considered.
Finally, Part V argues that the implementation of BTAs will be inconsis-
tent with existing principles in international environmental law and does
not seem to be an ideal solution, owing to negative impacts without effi-
ciently reducing global carbon emissions. This part makes a proposal for
initiating a climate regime that will encourage substantial participation of
developing countries22 as the most effective way to the abatement of
global emissions.
II. A BACKGROUND NARRATION
As governments of many countries have considered reducing carbon
emissions, an accompanying question is what measures are appropriate
to adjust competitive disadvantages to producers in energy-intensive in-
dustries (EIIs) and service providers with high carbon emissions. The
costs to make products that consume lots of energy and to provide ser-
vice with high carbon emissions are higher in the countries with more
stringent environmental policies than those without such policies.23 With
the hope of restoring competiveness, EIIs from developed countries have
actively lobbied for measures like BTAs against goods imported from
developing countries or services associated with developing countries.
BTAs, also known as border tax assessments,24 are import taxes levied
by carbon-taxing countries on goods manufactured in or service associ-
ated with non-carbon-taxing countries.25 In addition to promoting fair
competition, BTAs also aim at dealing with the problem of carbon leak-
age.26 Carbon leakage occurs when carbon emissions decrease in one
country while increasing in another country. However, the global emis-
21. See UNFCCC, supra note 10.
22. International Institute of Sustainable Development [IISD], Encouraging Developing Coun-
try Participation in Future Climate Change Regime, 1-3 (2009), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/de-
veloping_country_participation_in_climate.pdf.
23. See Paul Ekins, How Large a Carbon Tax is Justified by the Secondary Benefits of CO2
Abatement?, 18 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 161, 186-7 (2014).
24. Update on Border Tax Adjustments and Competitiveness Issues, CARBON TAX CENTER
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.carbontax.org/issues/nuts-and-bolts/going-global/.
25. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David A. Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009).
26. See Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage,
65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 445 (2005).
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sions are not necessarily decreased, creating the problem of carbon
leakage.27
Some measures have been discussed at the international level to ensure
the integrity of carbon emissions reduction efforts and to reduce the like-
lihood of carbon leakage from developed countries to developing coun-
tries. Unfortunately, most of these discussions ended up as quarrels over
global justice between developed and developing countries and eventu-
ally failed to reach in any enforceable agreements. On the one hand, from
the perspective of developed countries, a trade limitation measure like a
BTA is one of the options available to maintain the competiveness.28 On
the other hand, developing countries consider these competitive provi-
sions unfair due to the different paths and costs that each country can
afford. So, each country must base whether or not to progress on carbon
abatement on its own capacity.29
It is an especially heated topic for some developing countries like China
and India, which have more prosperous economies to discuss what the
proper policies are regarding climate change with corresponding interna-
tional obligations. To respond to the calling of BTAs, many developing
countries, like China, have decided to gradually step forward and attempt
to establish their own state-based carbon tax system or cap-and-trade
program. Instead of paying import fees, taking early actions can effec-
tively keep resources domestically and accelerate adaptation and mitiga-
tion. This paper will discuss the concerns towards the imposition of
BTAs against developing countries under the examination of interna-
tional environmental law from the perspective of a leading developing
country, China.
III. THE EU TAX ON AVIATION
The EU has set up emission trading schemes (ETS) through Directive
2003/87/EC, which was later amended by Directive 2004/101/EC. The
EU ETS is the first international company-level cap-and-trade scheme in
the world.3031 The carbon tax can also be imposed onto any service with
carbon intensity. For example, the EU has attempted to impose carbon
27. However, a measure might reduce carbon leakage while not reducing global emissions as a
whole, and in that case, the measure does not really contribute to carbon abatement since the trait for
carbon pollution is transboundary.
28. See supra note 5.
29. Barry Smit & Johanna Wandel, Adaptation, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability, 16
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 282, 292 (2006).
30. Directive 2003/87/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and
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taxes on air travel toward any airlines to, from, or within the EU’s air-
ports with effect from January 1, 2012. Airlines will face a bill in 2013
after 2012’s carbon emissions have been tallied. Under the EU ETS plan-
ning, any airline that does not comply could face a fine of 100 Euros
($128 USD) for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted for which they have
not surrendered allowances.32 The EU claimed that the carbon tax will
help achieving the goal of cutting emissions by 20% by 2020.33
Many countries, including China, India and the U.S., have strongly op-
posed the imposition of airline carbon tax. A group of 26 countries op-
posing the tax even met in Moscow for countermeasures in 2012.34
Compliance with the airline carbon tax means that customers taking
these airlines will have to pay additional costs for the fares, which will
lead to disadvantages to the airlines. Even with great contentions, the
European Court of Justice declared the plan valid, ruling against the U.S.
carriers contesting the legislation.35 Under the concept set by the Kyoto
Protocol, it is precluded to use any methods to combat climate change
outside of the United Nation’s scheme. The imposition of a global tax
based on the EU ETS could violate the rights under international laws
and protection of sovereignty entitled to by each country.
As the leader of developing countries, China’s government prohibited its
airlines to pay for the tax and also barred the airlines from increasing
their fares or adding new charges for the scheme.36 Further, India joined
China in boycotting the airline carbon tax. India barred its airlines from
complying with the European Union’s carbon taxation scheme, with the
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0087&from=EN.
31. Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004
amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trad-
ing within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0101&from=EN.
32. Nigam Prusty, EU Airline Carbon Tax Hurts Climate Change Fight, Claims China And
India, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/eu-aviation-basic-
idUSL5E8DE8AS20120214.
33. India Bans Its Airlines from Paying EU Carbon Tax, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Mar. 23,
2012), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/india-bans-its-airlines-from-paying-eu-carbon-tax/
506698.
34. Will Nichols, Opponents Discuss ‘Countermeasures’ to EU’s Aviation CO2 Plan, GREEN
BUSINESS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:9nd-b9446gIJ:
www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2153544/opponents-discuss-countermeasures-eus-aviation-co2-
plan+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
35. Europe’s Top Court Backs EU on Airline Carbon Tax, EURONEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://
www.euronews.com/2011/12/21/europe-s-top-court-backs-eu-on-airline-carbon-tax/.
36. China ‘Bans’ Airlines from Joining EU Carbon Scheme, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16901106.
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Indian government declaring that no Indian carrier would share emis-
sions data with the EU.37 India especially expressed the concerns that the
finance commitment promised by developed countries was yet not ful-
filled, and that now the imposition of the airline carbon tax will have
incidence on developing countries. The India’s Finance Ministry empha-
sized that “the multilateral negotiations must ensure that incidence
should not fall on developing countries which is in violation of the
CBDR principle.”38
Because of the huge divergence of border tax on aviation, the EU ETS
excluded the flights to and from non-EU countries in 2012.39 Flights
within EU are still subject to the tax. The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has reached a consensus agreement to establish a
market-based mechanism when the Assembly meets in 2016, which can
be expected to be implemented in 2020.40 In order to give enough time
for a global scheme to be discussed, the EU further extended the exemp-
tion for flights not within the EU to 2017.41
There seems to be a tug-of-war between developed and developing coun-
tries over the border tax issue. But, the truth is that not only developing
countries like China and India lined up to oppose the carbon tax. The
committees in both chambers of the U.S. Congress approved bills block-
ing participation in the program as well.4243 Even with a strong commit-
ment to dealing with climate change, President Obama signed a law
37. See India Bans Its Airlines, supra note 33.
38. India Concerned Over Carbon Tax on Airlines by EU, ZEE NEWS (Jul. 24, 2012), http://
zeenews.india.com/business/news/economy/india-concerned-over-carbon-tax-on-airlines-by-eu_564
98.html.
39. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM AVIATION, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
40. ICAO, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON AGENDA ITEM 17 (SECTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE) 17-7 to 17-16 (2013), available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Documents/WP/
wp430_en.pdf.
41. EU Backs Compromise on Plane CO2 Emissions, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26870587.
42. US Opposition to EU Airline Carbon Tax Builds, JOC, http://www.joc.com/international/
us-opposition-eu-airline-carbon-tax-builds (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
43. See ICTSD REPORTING, CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS.
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY, US HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOM-
ICS, (Mar. 5, 2008); INTERNATIONAL TRADE REVIEW, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION AND THE
USE OF GATT ARTICLE XX TO JUSTIFY A COMPETITIVENESS PROVISION IN THE WAKE OF BRAZIL-
TYRE (2008); Climate Plan Faces Challenge after Narrow US House Victory, BLOOMBERG, Jun. 29,
2009; Obama Opposes Trade Sanctions in Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2008.
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excluding U.S. airlines from the EU’s carbon trading system.44 The U.S.
stands firmly with China and India against the EU’s carbon tax because a
global level carbon border tax is both complex and controversial. Since
the impacts of climate change cross nations, the cooperation from each
separate group is indispensable to the success of any international mea-
sure, such as the cross-border carbon tax.
IV. REASONS AGAINST BTAS BASED ON CARBON
INTENSITY
A. VIOLATION OF THE CBDR PRINCIPLE
The concept of CBDR45 is receiving increasing recognition in interna-
tional law.46 Obviously, developing countries like China and India op-
pose these trade limitation measures requiring their industries to pay
taxes for selling goods to developed countries. As the Finance Ministry
of India pointed out, the incidence of the carbon tax is more likely to fall
to developing countries. Because most of the goods made by developing
countries are sold to and eventually consumed by consumers in devel-
oped countries, it seems unfair to impose carbon taxes based on where
the goods are manufactured.
Developing countries have asserted and it is recognized by the U.N. that,
like any industrialized nation in the world, each country has a right to
develop its economy and pursue prosperity.47 Although emissions from
developing countries are emerging, developed countries should be
mainly responsible for the GHG emissions according to the statistics re-
lied upon by the IPCC.48 Due to historical GHGs emitted by developed
countries, climate change actually resulted from industrial activities dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago.49 Hence, BTAs based on
current carbon intensity against developing countries will be deemed as
inequitable, while developing countries also have a solid ground to im-
pose BTAs against developed countries that do not comply with GHG
44. Suzanne Goldenburg, Obama Fails First Climate Test by Rejecting EU Aviation Carbon
Regime, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/28/obama-fails-
climate-test-aviation.
45. Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance
of Differentiated Responsibilities, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 35 (2000).
46. Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 276 (2004).
47. U.N., The United Nations: Development Agenda: Development for All, 67-72 (2007),
http://www.un.org/esa/devagenda/UNDA1.pdf.
48. Tariq Banuri et al., Equity and Social Considerations, in CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 53, 94 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
49. Id.
9
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emissions reduction standards. This corresponds to the spirit of the
CBDR principle.50
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol reaffirms the CBDR principle by requir-
ing “[a]ll Parties, [to take] into account their common but differentiated
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development pri-
orities, objectives and circumstances. . . .” It establishes unequivocally
the common responsibility of States to protect the global environment.51
Next, it builds on the acknowledgement by industrialized nations that
they must bear the primary responsibility in causing climate change.52
Last, it finds grounds for developing countries to join and start the emis-
sions reduction.53
Under the scheme of the Kyoto Protocol, only the Annex I Parties, which
are developed countries, are obligated to reduce GHGs emissions by
2012. These Annex I Parties have committed themselves to national or
joint reduction targets,54 which range from a joint reduction of 8% for
the European Union, 7% for the U.S.,55 6% for Japan and 0% for Russia.
The treaty also permits emission increases of 8% for Australia and 10%
for Iceland.56 Besides these countries, other countries are categorized as
non-Annex I Parties, like China and India.
Most non-Annex I Parties belonged to the low-income group, with very
few classified as middle-income. These developing countries have no in-
ternational mandatory responsibility to reduce GHGs emissions based on
the Kyoto Protocol. Noticeably, the responsibilities of developed and de-
veloping countries are distinguished by the rich-poor axis. The difference
was actually derived from the CBDR principle and the idea is memor-
ialized in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development:
50. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), https://unfccc.int/par-
ties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php.
51. Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the
Balance of Commitments Under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. EUROPEAN COMM. & INT’L ENVTL. L.
120, 120-131 (2000).
52. Id.
53. This notion is especially important for including developing countries in climate negotia-
tion by addressing its differentiated, but “shared” duties under the UNFCCC.
54. In Article 4.1 of the Kyoto Protocol, it is formally called quantified emission limitation and
reduction objectives (QELRO).
55. The goal is non-binding as the U.S. was not a signatory until now.
56. Industrialized Countries to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 5.2%, United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme, (Dec. 11, 1997).
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States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s
ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global envi-
ronmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the re-
sponsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustain-
able development in view of the pressures their societies place
on the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command.57
Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration also states that due to the “special
situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least devel-
oped and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special
priority.”58
Accordingly, BTAs based on carbon intensity against developing coun-
tries will most likely violate the CBDR principle set by the Kyoto Proto-
col. By reevaluating BTAs under the CBDR principle, BTAs are
supposed to encourage voluntary reduction action, not act as mandatory
penalties. Although the term of the common but differentiated responsi-
bility was first included in the Kyoto Protocol, other conventions that did
not use the term still differentiated obligations. The 1987 Montreal Pro-
tocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is
an example of the common but differentiated spirit.59 The protocol gave
less-developed countries a grace period for coming into compliance and
established a fund to provide them with the incremental costs to imple-
mentation.60 Many argue that the Kyoto Protocol interpreted the spirit
wrongfully. While developing countries were only given grace period for
implementation in the Montreal Protocol, there are completely no re-
sponsibilities for developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore,
the Kyoto Protocol has been called the “most rigid application”61 of the
57. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1
(Vol. I), Annex I (Aug.12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration on Environment and Development].
58. Id.
59. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
60. See Amendments to Montreal Protocol, art. 10.
61. Michael Weisslitz, Note, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global
Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 473, 483 (2002); See also Kristen
Sheeran, Beyond Kyoto: North-South Implications of Emissions Trading and Taxes, 5 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST, 697, 703 (2007).
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CBDR principle because developing nations assumed that no binding ob-
ligations were manifested in the Kyoto Protocol.
Whether the Kyoto Protocol has interpreted the spirit correctly is irrele-
vant. Because the value of CBDR lies on the notion of equality, the Ky-
oto mechanism is designed to inspire developing countries to voluntarily
reduce GHG emissions and in nowhere composes compulsory punish-
ment against non-Annex I Parties for incompliance.62 To be in accor-
dance with the scheme, all trade limitation measures should be used to
encourage voluntary reduction action, instead of penalties or mandatory
tools. Therefore, the rationale behind BTAs is inconsistent with the
CBDR principle. Although the principle of state responsibility has been
introduced to remedy an intentionally wrongful act of a State,63 the
wrongful act must be governed by international law and constitute a
breach of international responsibility of the State.64 As discussed, The
Kyoto Protocol does not carry obligatory carbon reductions towards de-
veloping countries, and hence, state responsibility is not triggered.
B. ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
UNDER THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE
Based on projections from the three reports produced by the IPCC in
2007 (IPCC 2007), the urgency and need for adaptation65 is high-
lighted.66 The 2007 report “Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities,
and Adaptation in Developing Countries” by the UNFCCC concluded
that developing countries were the most vulnerable to climate change
impacts due to fewer resources available to adapt “socially, technologi-
62. Developing countries are exempted for the reduction obligation because they are non-An-
nex I Parties, but the exclusions of countries like China and India also make the Kyoto Protocol
crippled in enforcement. A meaningful climate negotiation should have substantial participation
from developing countries. See infra Part V.
63. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 77-86 (2002).
64. U.N. Charter, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 1, 2001, reads:
“[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”
Article 2 reads: “[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an
action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State.”
65. “Adaptation” refers to a process, action or outcome in a system, like in household, commu-
nity, group, sector, region, or country, in order for the system to better cope with, manage or adjust
to some changing condition, stress, hazard, risk or opportunity. N. Brooks, Vulnerability, Risk and
Adaptation: A Conceptual Framework (Tyndall Ctr. For Climate Change Research, Working Paper
No. 38, 2003).
66. See UNFCCC, supra note 10, at 5.
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cally and financially.”67 Climate change is anticipated to have far reach-
ing effects on the sustainable development68 of developing countries,
including their ability to attain the United Nations Millennium Develop-
ment Goals by 2015,69 ranging from halving the extreme poverty and
ensuring environmental sustainability to growing global partnerships for
development.
Indeed, climate change has demonstrated its global impact on each coun-
try in every region on Earth. Numerous countries have suffered sizable
losses as a result of extreme weather events because climate change
tends to increase the frequency of extreme weather, such as severe
storms, extensive droughts and wildfires. In the U.S., one important con-
sequence of climate change for disaster risk is the increase in weather
extremes. The U.S. Global Change Research Program has noted that
“changes in these kinds of weather and climate events are among the
most serious challenges to our nation in coping with a changing
climate.”70
Even though many countries come up with disaster response plans ac-
cordingly, in reality, most governments have not completely met the re-
sponsibility of covering substantial losses from recurrent, small-scale
events, which are usually transferred to and borne by low-income house-
holds.71 This explains why climate change has brought disproportionate
impacts to low-income households, which exist mostly in developing
countries. There is also empirical evidence that shows that poor areas
suffer disproportionately high levels of damage in disasters and that this
is related to factors such as unsafe housing.72 This makes developing
countries much more vulnerable as compared to developed countries to
disasters related to climate change. While the developed nations of the
67. UNFCCC, Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation in Developing Coun-
tries, at 5 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf.
68. To decide the extent of development for each country, the information regarding sus-
tainability must be provided by each country. Though there are many definitions of sustainability
development, for the most commonly cited one see Rep. of the World Comm. on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, U.N. Doc A/42/427 (1987) (“development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”).
69. Id.
70. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 32 (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-
impacts-report.pdf.
71. U.N., Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Revealing Risk, Redefining
Development: Summary and Main Findings, 12 (2011), http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hy-
ogo/gar/2011/en/home/executive.html.
72. U.N., International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: Global Assessment Report on Disaster
Risk Reduction, ch. 1, 3-12 (2009), http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/
index.php?id=9413.
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world produce the majority of GHG, the burden of impact, nevertheless,
is somehow more severe on developing countries.73
As one of the most core concepts in international law,74 the principle of
sustainable development reflects the development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.75 It is often illustrated as the balance between
economic development and environmental protection. Unfortunately,
BTAs primarily deal with the issue of competitiveness of developed
countries. The consequence of this could be deterrent for developing
countries to transit to a sustainable ecology.76
Developing countries not only have larger vulnerable populations and
national economies dependent on agricultural production, they are also
less equipped to deal with extreme weather events.77 The UNDP Crisis
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) report, “Reducing Disaster Risk: a
Challenge for Development,” concluded that poorer countries have dis-
proportionately higher mortality and economic loss risks, given several
levels of exposure to all the hazards. In fact, high-income countries ac-
count for 39% of the exposure to tropical cyclones, but low-income
countries account for no less than 81% of the mortality risk.78 The Inter-
national Strategy for Disaster Reduction, a U.N. agency based in Geneva,
estimated that the share of the global economy at direct risk from floods
has doubled since 1990 and that in 2007, 28% more people are now
vulnerable to losing their homes, incomes, and lives than two decades
ago.79 In particular, Asia is home to 75% of the world’s at-risk popula-
tion for floods.80 It might come as a shock that 40% of the world’s natu-
ral disasters occurred in Asia from 1999 through 2008, as the continent
accounted for 80% of disaster-related deaths.81
Despite the lack of an internationally recognized way of categorizing
countries according to their level of vulnerability, many scientists con-
73. United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], The Crisis Prevention and Recovery
(BCPR) Report Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development, 6 (2004), http://www.un
.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/Global-Reports/UNDP%20Reducing%20Disaster%20Risk.pdf.
74. Barry Smit & Olga Pilifosova, Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable
Development and Equity, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 879, 902 (2003).
75. See supra note 68.
76. See SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMM’N, Prosperity Without Growth?-The Transition to
a Sustainable Economy (2009).
77. See UNDP, supra note 73.
78. See Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk, supra note 71.
79. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, DEALING WITH DISASTERS 1-29 (2011).
80. Id. at 7.
81. See id. at 14.
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sider China to be the world’s most threatened nation in terms of loss and
damage due to climate change.82 As a rapidly emerging country, China is
especially susceptible to droughts, floods, typhoons, and rises in sea level
attributable, overall, to the long coastline and overpopulation.83 Even
though the average annual number of births during 2012 per 1,000 per-
sons in the population is 12.31 (births/1000 population), which is lower
than the U.S. of 13.7, China now has a population of about 1.353 bil-
lion.84 Compared to the 315 million people in the U.S.,85 the population
density in China is 143 people per square kilometer of land area versus
34 in the U.S., around a quarter of China’s population density. Living
conditions are meant to be harsh for the majority of Chinese people and
the high occurrence of extreme weather events further forces the Chinese
government to face a rigid examination of disaster preparation. The gov-
ernment has only started to learn cooperation with private charities since
the Wenchuan Great Earthquake in 2008.86
Disaster risk associated with climate change is actually worse than ex-
pected because of poor disaster risk management (DRM) and for lack of
awareness towards DRM. How to respond to disasters “promptly, effec-
tively and in a fair way” becomes a tremendous challenge to either devel-
oped or developing countries. Among these three goals, most of the time,
accuracy and fairness are sacrificed for pursuing timely assistance. Even
for a developed country like the U.S., the disaster of Hurricane Katrina
posed a serious test to its emergency response system. Based on the final
report of the select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina made by the U.S. House in 2006, it is
clear that the federal government, in general, and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), in particular, were not prepared to respond to
the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina.87
82. Lisa Friedman, Which Nations Are Most Vulnerable to Climate Change? The Daunting
Politics of Choosing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/02/24/24cli-
matewire-which-nations-are-most-vulnerable-to-climate-95690.html?pagewanted=print.
83. Gideon Kracov, Shufan Sung & Mitchell M. Tsai, Can Citizen Suits Help China Battle
Pollution?, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 8, 2014, http://www.gideonlaw.net/news/CitizenSuitsInChina.pdf.
84. See China Population Statistics, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/19323/total-
population-of-china/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
85. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/
www/popclock.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
86.  [Zhenyao Wang], [The Five-Year History of Chinese
Disaster Response and Public Interest],  [CIXUN] (May. 7, 2013), http://www.icixun.com/
2013/0507/862.html.
87. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HUR-
RICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. NO. 109-396, at 151 (2006), http://www
.disastersrus.org/katrina/USHousereport.pdf.
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The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was pro-
vided with the authority to forge a federal approach to emergency man-
agement and was in charge of the release of disaster response assets to
the state when Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana in 2005. It turned out that
FEMA disbursed more than $8 billion in assistance payments, some of
which were later determined to have been improperly paid to individuals
who were ineligible or who received duplicate payments. Because
FEMA relaxed its internal controls in order to provide expedited delivery
of assistance grants to displaced disaster survivors, the debts in question
thus arose. In order to solve the problem, Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed the Disaster Assistance Recoupment Fairness Act of 2011
(DARFA) to provide FEMA discretionary authority to waive debts aris-
ing from improper payments provided for disaster declared between Au-
gust 28, 2005 and December 31, 2010. It caused $250 million worth of
financial loss and, in order to implement the provisions of DARFA, it
cost FEMA another $7.28 million to train its staff and conduct waiver
activities. A total of $257.28 million in taxpayers’ money was wasted
lightly in a single disaster.88
This does not only happen in the U.S. In China, for example, the central
government’s auditing towards each province’s disaster response assets
allocation implementation becomes an important task for auditors of the
People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China. The improper alloca-
tion of disaster response assets is a disaster itself for the unfairness cre-
ated and money wasted. It can be fiscally irresponsible and
environmentally damaging if the decision is not made in a risk-sensitive
way. Especially in a society lacking of information transparency, Chi-
nese people can hardly know how much each disaster assistance program
costs them and how the money is spent.
Therefore, in order to identify, access and reduce disaster risk, the U.N.
approved the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 at its World Con-
ference of Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in 2005.89 The idea is to provide
an internationally accepted framework for disaster risk reduction with
principles to follow. In the “National Progress Report on the Implemen-
tation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011-2013) – interim,” pre-
pared by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, among the many constraints
88. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-12-127, FEMA’S EFFORTS
TO RECOUP IMPROPER PAYMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DISASTER ASSISTANCE RECOUPMENT
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2011, 2-9 (Sept. 2012), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-
127_Sep12.pdf.
89. U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA),
http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
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discussed, the most serious critiques were that China still had weak dis-
aster prevention and reduction infrastructures,90 without a normative and
unified national disaster risk management data standard system at the
national level91 and the Chinese government inputs limited expenditures
on disaster prevention and reduction science and technology R&D and
application each year.92
Furthermore, local governments depend too much on funding support
from the central government and undertake major responsibilities of dis-
aster reduction and relief with limited participation of social resources.93
What is perhaps worst of all, is that it is very difficult to drive commu-
nity disaster reduction in rural areas, especially in western and central
regions,94 which could enlarge the urban and rural development gap.
This is because of the considerably uneven development among regions
and between rural and urban areas and the export of a large number of
migrant workers with stay-at-home senior citizens and children.95
A strong civil society and the media play critical roles in creating aware-
ness of the rights and the social demand for DRM.96 With increasing
government transparency and public participation, developing countries
like China can become more open over time, enabling people to get in-
volved in the policy-making process. But before that comes, China will
need to develop an integrated and effective disaster risk evaluation sys-
tem so it can cope with severe challenges and support its sustainable
development. Developing countries need far more financial and technical
assistance from developed countries in order to help establish DRM and
adapt impacts of climate change sooner. Instead of constructing these
regions in a sustainable way, trade limitations, such as BTAs, will work
on the contrary.
C. EFFORTS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR BEING GREEN UNDER
THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
Most people might still bear the inaccurate impression that developing
countries make less or no effort in reducing GHGs emissions. China, for
90. CHINA’S MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 2011-2013 – INTERIM 30 (2012), http://www.preven-
tionweb.net/english/countries/asia/chn/.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 40.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id.
96. See Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk, supra note 71, at 17.
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example, has long been criticized by the international community for not
taking any carbon emissions reduction responsibilities. In the meantime,
China made it clear that it will not follow any country’s footprint in re-
ducing carbon emissions, but it will make its own policy and implement
it according to China’s economic and social development conditions. In
fact, developing countries like China and India are considered “greener”
than many developed countries. Under the principle of polluter pays, pol-
luting entities are legally and financially responsible for the harmful con-
sequences of their pollution.97 The polluter pays principle requires the
responsible individual, firm, or nation to bear the cost of pollution and
reduce the harm.98 Although developing countries like China and India
are not mandatory in reducing their emissions, these countries, like China
for example, have exhibited thriving efforts to support the voluntary re-
duction mission.
First, compared to developed countries, the energy use per capita in de-
veloping countries is still very low. For example, in 2010, the energy use
(kg of oil equivalent per capita) in China was last reported at 1807 and
Hong Kong was at 1951.99 Meanwhile, in the same year, India was at
565 and Brazil was at 1362.100 Although the 2011 data for these coun-
tries are yet to be published, the previous 2010 data can be compared
with the 2011 data reported by the following developed countries. In
2011, the United States was reported at 7069, Canada was at 7426, Aus-
tralia was at 5295, Norway was at 6032, Luxembourg was at 8027 and
the Netherlands was at 4644.101 Energy use per capita in most developed
countries is 3 to 18 times higher than developing countries.
Secondly, despite that lifestyles in developing countries are inherently
more energy conservative and economical than developed countries, in
2009, China led the U.S. and other G-20 members in clean energy invest-
ments and finance, according to data released by the Pew Charitable
Trusts, with $34.6 billion invested by China, which nearly doubled the
97. See Stefanie Sommers, The Brownfield Problem: Liability For Lenders, Owners, and De-
velopers in Canada and the United States, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L & POL’Y 259, 266-7, 277-91
(2008) (comparing the application of the polluter pays principle in the United States and Canada and
discussing Brownfield liability in Canada and the problems of enforcing Canada’s Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)).
98. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 57. See also SUMUDU
A. ATAPATTU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 470 (Transnational
Publishers 2006).
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U.S.’s total of $18.6 billion.102 That is not all. Further, in 2010, China
was the leading country in new capacity investment of renewable energy,
followed by Germany, the U.S., Italy and Brazil. Turning to the aspect of
renewable power capacity, in 2010, China owned the most abundant re-
newable power capacity in the world, if hydro power capacity is in-
cluded. China also overtook the U.S. as the global leader in installed
wind power capacity in 2010. According to the newest data released by
the Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA),103 by the
end of 2010, China had installed a total of 41.8 gigawatts (GW) of wind
capacity, just ahead of the U.S.’s total of 40.2 GW. The growth of
China’s wind sector is more impressive. While the U.S. added only about
5 GW of new capacity in 2010, China installed 16 GW in the same
year.104 In 2011, China contributed one fifth of its total investment vol-
ume for 52 billion USD, topping the U.S. in renewable energy invest-
ment.105 Germany, Italy and India rounded out the top five on the list.106
It is obvious that China not only tops, but also leads in global renewable
energy investment.
Third, the Chinese government announced in January 2012 that it would
levy a carbon tax before 2015. Actually, proposals for a new environ-
mental taxation system had already been submitted for review to the
Ministry of Finance and were expected to be implemented before the end
of the 2011-15 Five-Year Plan.107 This means that China intends or at
least is preparing to launch a national carbon tax system in 2015. This
country not only performs impressively in spending money, but also in
decreasing carbon intensity and energy intensity. Between 2006 and
2010, the country achieved a 19.1% drop in energy intensity, roughly
meeting its five-year target to improve energy efficiency by 20%.108 The
102. Pew Study: China Leads G-20 Members in Clean Energy, Finance and Investment, PR
NEWSWIRE (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pew-study-china-leads-g-
20-members-in-clean-energy-finance-and-investment-89084252.html.
103. Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association [CREIA] is established under the ap-
proval of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and with support from the
project of “Acceleration in China’s Commercialization of Renewable Energy Capacity-Building,”
overseen by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. CREIA, http://www.creia.net/.
104. China Becomes World’s Largest Wind Installation Country, Challenges Remains, GREEN-
PEACE (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/106571/20110129/greenpeace-china-be-
comes-world-s-largest-wind-installation-country-challenges-remain.htm/.
105. Frank Jordans, China Topped USA in Renewable Energy Investment in 2011, USA TODAY,
Jun. 11, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-06-11/Renewa-
ble-energy-investment/55517876/1.
106. Id.
107. Sid Maher, China to Tax Carbon by 2015, THE AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www
.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/china-to-tax-carbon-by-2015/story-fn59niix-1226238633181.
108. Li Jing, Carbon Intensity Targets Unveiled, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/01/content_12092285.htm.
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country has a target to reduce the level of GHG emissions per unit of
GDP by 17% during 2011-2015, with a 2050 goal of cutting emissions
by 40-45% as compared to 2005 levels.109 In 2012, the government had
announced that China outperformed its carbon intensity reduction targets
with a 3.5% cut, which illustrates China’s ability to emit gradually less
carbon per unit of economic output.110
As the largest developing country in the world, China’s good attempt to
enhance energy efficiency and reduce carbon intensity is just one exam-
ple of how developing countries try to fulfill their responsibilities effec-
tively, but voluntarily. Though developed countries aggressively propose
to levy BTAs to push developing countries into reducing GHGs emis-
sions, it seems unjustified for some developing countries that sufficiently
deal with the problem to further pay the tax. Moreover, considering the
complexity of GHGs emissions calculation, it is almost impossible to
calculate a precise rate for applying BTAs in each country.111 For exam-
ple, although most products are made by EIIs manufacturers in develop-
ing countries, these products are sold and eventually used by consumers
in developed countries. Should BTAs solely be levied to manufacturers
from developing countries?
Other than green investments, China has largely expanded its policies
and laws to fulfill its international responsibility in carbon reduction. For
example, at the Warsaw Climate Change Conference, China’s govern-
ment published its first National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (Plan),
which is a laudable step in the direction for carbon reduction.112 The
publication of the Plan signifies the awareness of the importance of cli-
mate change tasks at the highest governmental level and marks the first
time China’s government has advanced climate change tasks to such a
“national strategic” position. .113 During the 11th five-year plan period
(2006-2010), China’s State Council announced a policy to shut down
small coal-fired power plants with 50 gigawatts capacity causing air pol-
lution and to replace smaller power plants with larger and more efficient
109. Id.
110. John Parnell, Chinese Carbon Intensity Drops 3.5% in 2012, RTCC (Jan. 11, 2013), http://
www.rtcc.org/chinese-carbon-intensity-drops-3-5-in-2012/.
111. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic and Environmental Effects of
Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy, BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 1, 4 (2008/2009) (“We con-
clude that it is an unnecessary distraction for the global community to focus much attention on
negotiations over border tax adjustments as a component of climate policy.”).
112. Shufan Sung, China’s Response and Commitment in Warsaw, NAT’L ENV’T ENERGY &
RESOURCES NEWSL.-A.B.A. Sec., Apr. 2014, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/nr_newsletters/ihc/201404_ihc.authcheckdam.pdf.
113. Id. at 18.
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ones.114 In the 12th five-year plan period (2011-2015), China has been
focusing on very aggressive targets in lowering energy consumption in-
tensity per unit GDP by 16% and carbon dioxide emissions per unit GDP
by 17%.115 At the same time, non-fossil fuels in primary energy con-
sumption is set to reach 11.4%.116 In addition, China also amended its
civil procedure117 and environmental protection law118 to permit citizen
suits being brought by certain qualified groups, though the threshold re-
mains difficult for citizens to participate and therefore, the amendments
are being criticized.119
On the other hand, when OECD countries embrace BTAs to maintain
competitiveness for their domestic manufacturers, the leading players,
American firms, still enjoy unfair trade advantage because of the cheap
energy.120 Many American firms are continuing to be massively subsi-
dized, with oil production being among one of the most heavily subsi-
dized businesses, where tax breaks are available at every stage from
exploration to the extraction process.121 According to a Congress Budget
Office report released in 2005, the effective tax rate of capital invest-
ments in oil field leases and drilling equipment is around 9%, which is
significantly lower than the average rate of 25% for businesses in gen-
114.  [NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COM-
MISSION],  [the 11th Five-Year Plan for Administrating
SO2 from Existing Coal-Fired Power Plant], (2007), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/fzgh/ghwb/
115zxgh/200709/P020070928509232490884.pdf.
115. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), XINHUA (Mar. 16, 2011), http://news.sina.com
.cn/c/2011-03-17/055622129864.shtml.
116. Id.
117. Recognizing the role that citizen enforcement can play in protecting the environment, re-
cent changes to Chinese laws may foster citizen suits and public interest environmental litigation. In
2012, the National People’s Congress (NPC) (the Chinese government’s national legislature)
amended Article 55 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law to permit “where environment is polluted,
the lawful rights and interests of a throng of consumers are infringed upon, or other acts impairing
the public interests are committed, the agencies stipulated by law and relevant organizations may
bring actions to the people’s court.” See U.N., International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, supra
note 72.
118. In October 2013, the NPC published a Third Draft Bill of the Environmental Protection
Law.  Proposed Article 48 was amended to broaden standing requirements to allow citizen suits by
“national social organizations specializing in environmental and welfare activities for five consecu-
tive years or more, reputable and legally registered in the Ministry of Civil Affairs. . ..” See U.N.,
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, supra note 72.
119. Id.
120. Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 2 (2004),
available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/2008_New_Agenda_
for_Global_Warming.pdf.
121. David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/business/04bptax.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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eral.122 If the U.S. were to levy import fees on goods from developing
countries, it is fair that these developing countries should also impose
energy tariffs on American goods, if such importation is not banned by
these affected countries. Not to mention that, based on BP’s statistic data,
the U.S. prices of natural gas have stayed low since the Great Depres-
sion.123 As a Siemens spokesman noted, “the U.S. energy market re-
mains very competitive with record low natural gas prices and slow
energy demand growth.”124
Although old grid infrastructures in many developing countries still re-
main a long way from massively reducing GHG emissions, developing
countries eagerly cultivate new energy industries and attempt to improve
service industries to fasten industrial trans-conformation and updating.
With noteworthy accomplishments, the leading developing countries in-
deed share the responsibility in reducing carbon emissions under the pol-
luter pays principle, rendering BTAs senseless.
D. THE NEGLECTED ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Environmental justice (EJ) is the fair treatment and meaningful involve-
ment of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of en-
vironmental laws, regulations, and policies.125 In 1993, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) established the National Environmental
Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) in order to obtain independent, con-
sensus advice and recommendations from a broad spectrum of stakehold-
ers involved in environmental justice. It was first introduced into U.S.
law by Executive Order of President Clinton in February 1994,126 as he
requested federal actions to address the EJ issue in minority populations
and low-income populations. This federal action led environmental work
towards more EJ promotion afterwards. As of today, it is common to test
economics measures under such concepts in evaluation impacts, which
might prejudice human welfare and wildlife protection. This is especially
122. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE [CBO], TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND
APPROACHES TO REFORM 11-28 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/67xx/doc6792/10-18-tax.pdf.
123. Statistic Data, BP (2013), http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=903
7181&contentId=7068643.
124. Ryan Tracy, U.S. Wind Industry’s Roar Might Diminish in 2013, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2013, at B2.
125. See What Is Environmental Justice?, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/.
126. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994), available at http://www.epa
.gov/region2/ej/exec_order_12898.pdf.
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vital in the U.S. for a diverse environment with different races.127 In
China, around 90% of the population belongs to the Han ethnic group
and only 10% of the population stands as a minority.128
Carbon pollution is considered the main contributor to climate disrup-
tion,129 which leads to extreme weathers like record-breaking heat waves
and massive hurricanes. Minority and low-income communities are often
disproportionately exposed to pollution and they become the main vic-
tims of carbon pollution. Therefore, different ways to offset production
costs by manufactures must be examined carefully with a concern for EJ
in order to consider cumulative impacts that might adversely affect the
communities.
While the fair treatment means that no group of people, including any
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from indus-
trial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal,
state, local, and tribal programs and policies,130 the application of BTAs
requires manufacturers from developing countries to pay diminishes on
resources from developing countries that could be used to cope with cli-
mate change, which brings a disproportionate share of the negative envi-
ronmental consequences from industrial activities. Instead of BTAs,
developing countries would prefer to keep resources, assist in adaptation
and mitigation, and reduce GHG emissions from manufacturing
processes. From the perspective of developing countries, to levy an ex-
port carbon tax (ECT) is a much more appealing approach.131
127. See Manuel Pastor Jr., et al., Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-In and
Environmental Justice, 23 J. URBAN AFFAIRS 1 (2001), available at http://www.cjtc.ucsc.edu/docs/
a_Which_Came_First.pdf.
128.  [NATIONAL STATISTICAL BUREAU], 2005
 [2005 National Sample Survey of 1% of the population
Main Data Bulletin], (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200603/
t20060316_30326.html. See infra discussions with migrating workers.
129. See Gayathri Vaidyanathan & Climate Wire, The Worst Climate Pollution Is Carbon Diox-
ide, SCI. AM. (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-worst-cli-
mate-pollution-is-carbon-dioxide/.
130. See DAVID SCHLOSBERG, DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES, MOVEMENTS, AND
NATURE 2-30 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); Benjamin Hale, The Moral Considerability of Invasive
Transgenic Animals, 19 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 337, 337-66 (2006); Ramona Ilea, Nussbaum’s
Capabilities Approach and Nonhuman Animals: Theory and Public Policy, 39 J. SOC. PHIL. 547,
547-63 (2008); Jay Drydyk, A Capability Approach to Justice as a Virtue, 15 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 23, 23-38 (2012); Kimberly K. Smith, Animals and the Social Contract, 30 ENVTL.
ETHICS 195, 195-207 (2008); Anders Schinkel, Martha Nussbaum on Animal Rights, 13 ETHICS &
ENV’T 41, 41-69 (2008).
131. See Andrea Baranzini et al., A Future for Carbon Taxes, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 395, 408-
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People with lower income in developing countries are the most poten-
tially affected community residents and should have an appropriate op-
portunity to participate in decisions about a proposed activity that will
affect their environment or health.132 In this case, when resources are
taken away and given to subsidy manufacturers in developed countries,
people or manufacturers from developing countries should be given
chances to have their opinions be heard.133 Though not necessarily pub-
lic’s contribution may influence the regulatory agency’s decision and the
concerns of all participants involved may not be addressed.134 However,
the decision makers should seek out and facilitate the involvement of
those potentially affected.135 By providing sufficient approaches for de-
veloping countries to convey their positions, it will remind the decision
makers that the application of BTAs will have dramatic impacts to devel-
oping countries, so the issue should be addressed carefully with a consid-
eration for EJ.
Even when developed countries impose import taxes on goods manufac-
tured in developing countries, manufacturers will continue producing as
long as there are customers. However, the additional expense will be
passed to customers, which keeps the prices up and eventually leads to a
decrease of import demand.136 Developed countries will, instead, import
goods from other countries with border tax to support BTAs and China
will significantly shift its exports towards other regions without BTAs.137
The purchase ability of low income people in developed countries will be
affected accordingly by being forced to purchase more expensive prod-
ucts made in regions with BTAs. Of course, China’s international trade
will suffer large losses in exports, but in the long term, domestic markets
will take over.138
10 (2000); John Whalley et al., The International Incidence of Carbon Taxes, in GLOBAL WARMING:
ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES 235-350 (Rudiger Dornbusch ed., 1991).
132. See Pastor, supra note 127.
133. Id.
134. The substantial participation of the public is important, but with its own limits due to the
limited resources of agencies in reality and the timeline required to make a decision. See Cheryl
Simrell King et al., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public
Administration, 58 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 317, 317-26 (1998); Caron Chess et al., Public Participa-
tion and the Environment: Do We Know What Works?, 33 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2685, 2685-92
(1999); Gene Rowe et al., Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation, 25 SCI.
TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 3, 3-29 (2000).
135. Id.
136. See Ling Tang et al., Carbon-Based Border Tax Adjustments and China’s International
Trade: Analysis Based on a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model (Crawford School
Research, Paper No. 1301, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213057.
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id.
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The more likely situation is where developing countries implement
ECTs. Take China for example. Some research shows that it could be in
China’s interest to implement such tax. However, with a given ECT set
at 200 Yuan/t CO2, it would also lead to a decrease in export demand.
This would result in an unemployment rate of about 0.05% in the short
term since the unskilled rural-urban migrant workers could be released
by the export-oriented enterprises and are hard to be absorbed by other
sectors.139 This group is often called “Nong Min Gong,”140 meaning the
migrant workers from rural to urban areas, and is a growing and floating
population in China.
In China, Nong Min Gong are mostly composed of people with rural
residences in the “hukou” (registered residence) system.141 The modern
Hukou system was created in 1950s by the post-war communist govern-
ment to control migration into and out of urban areas.142 However, the
earliest Hukou system on record can be traced back to the Western Zhou
Dynasty (1027-771 BC).143 In addition to the inequality existing in hous-
ing, education, and social welfare, these rural migrants are more likely to
be exposed to high levels of air and water pollution.144 According to the
statistical data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the pop-
ulation of these migrant workers reached 252 million in 2011.145 The
total population of these migrant workers rapidly grew from 70 million
people in 1993 to 140 million in 2003, and reached over 252 million in
2011.146 Considering these statistics, the population of the floating work-
ers have doubled every decade.
139. Ji Feng Li et al., Is It in China’s Interest to Implement an Export Carbon Tax?, 34 ENERGY
ECON. 2072, 2072-80 (2012).
140.  [CHINA NEWS WEB],
[Resolve Two Key New Urbanization: The Tenancy Will Stopped Out of Migrant Workers], Feb. 2,
2015, http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150202/141421454498.shtml.
141. Chunbo Ma & Ethan Schoolman, Environmental Justice in China, Paper Presented at the
Australian Sociological Association Annual Meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems
(2008), http://www.isecoeco.org/conferences/isee2012-versao3/pdf/848.pdf.
142. Id. at 4.
143.  [Jianxiong Ge],  [Past and Present of the Household Regis-
tration System],  [PENGPAI RESEARCH INSTITUTE] (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www
.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1308420.
144. See Ma & Schoolman, supra note 141; Residents with urban Hukou became a privileged
minority in China for the next three decades and are still heavily subsidized and favored by the state
today. FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION AND EXCLUSION: CHINA’S HUKOU SYSTEM
47 (Stanford Univ. Press 2005).
145. 250 Million Nong Min Gong Group Survey: Lost between the City and Country, CRNTT
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Yet, research for this special group is insufficient and social problems
inherent to this disfavored group are abound. To address increasing con-
cerns for these “shadows of the city,” under the 12th Five-Year Plan, the
Chinese government has begun to investigate the unemployment rate of
Nong Ming Gong, which has never been reported before.147 The Chinese
government established the data, but in the end, did not publish it with
the concern that the number, at around 5%, might be too high.148 Even
so, calls for enhancing benefits for migrating workers have soared since
human rights issues have received more attention in recent years. China’s
government has proposed to formally include the study for the unem-
ployment rate of migrating workers formally in the next 13th Five-Year
Plan.149 With little change to the unemployment rate, it could largely
affect numerous low-income workers with minimum skills and obstruct
the transition towards a sustainable economy.150 These workers should
not be treated unfairly simply because of their rural residence registry
and work on a temporary basis. Such disproportionate treatment is con-
sidered as a violation of EJ.151
V. CONCLUSION
Developed countries have eagerly proposed BTAs to restore competive-
ness and avoid carbon leakage. However, there are simply too many pit-
falls for BTAs to be a good option to be followed. Mostly, it will violate
the CBDR principle set by the Kyoto Protocol to encourage voluntary
carbon reduction by developing countries. Thus, to oblige developing
countries to take their shares with a stick is arguably valid. However,
when financial and technical assistance for adaptation and mitigation are
urgently needed in developing countries since developing countries are
147.  [Ming Xiao, et al.], 
[Resident Migrant Workers to be Included in the Statistics - or Will be Included in the Survey




150. See WU Y.J. AND XUAN X.W., THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAX AND ITS
APPLICATION IN CHINA (Economic Science Press 2002); Ke Wang et al., Analysis of the Economic
Impact of Different Chinese Climate Policy Options Based on a CGE Model Incorporating Endoge-
nous Technological Change, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2930, 2930-40 (2009).
151.  [Shuwen Li],  [Year Built Envi-
ronment Perspective Justice ‘Farmers Environmental Right’ Concept System],
[RURAL ECONOMY], Aug. 2013;  [Zuohan Zhou],  [Yinghong Zhang],
 [Environmental Rights in Contemporary Chinese Peasants],
 [HUNAN NORMAL U. SOC. SCI.] (Mar. 2007);  [Shuwen Li],
 [Dapeng Ren], 
[Under the Authority of the Environmental Right Angle Conflict Rational Debate - Needs Based on
the Forefront of Environmental Protection of the Right of Citizens], Issue 17, 2010.
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most vulnerable to climate change impacts due to a lack of resources,
BTAs will only serve to inefficiently reallocate resources from develop-
ing countries to developed countries. This frustrates the transition to-
wards a sustainable society in developing countries. Further, though
many developing countries have been blamed for doing nothing to re-
duce carbon emissions, leading countries like China and India, in fact,
have transformed differently in response to the emissions reduction call-
ings. By examining investments in green energy industries and lifestyles
of developing countries and considering that these regions started reduc-
tion actions much later, it is persuasive that these developing countries
are flourishing with good results in their upmost reduction endeavors.
The impressive results correspond to their voluntary reduction duty
under the principle of polluter pays.
Additionally, the consideration of environmental justice suggests that by
applying BTAs, not only will low-income communities be adversely and
disproportionately affected, but they will also hardly have a chance to get
meaningfully involved. For large populations of migrant workers in
China, the estimated unemployment rate that will be caused by BTAs
will result in serious social problem and counteract the transition to a
sustainable economy. Moreover, low-income people in developed coun-
tries will be compelled to fulfill daily needs by shifting the purchases
from affordable goods made by developing countries to more expensive
products made in other regions. BTAs are in no way a win-win strategy
for developed and developing countries.
As discussed, China’s government has pointed out that if there are BTAs
or similar measures targeted on products made in China, it would rather
implement a domestic cap-and-trade scheme or impose a carbon tax than
pay import fees to satisfy the standard of environmental policy in another
jurisdiction. The approach is understandable since the resources can be
used to assist reduction action in China. The resources can also be used
to subsidize carbon-intensity sectors that would be most affected, to up-
date equipment and decrease pollution. By doing this, China would be
the beneficiary from its cap-and-trade or ECT program without sharing
the revenues with outsiders.
Other developing countries have also voiced that if there were BTAs,
then, as response for an infraction of the non-discriminating principle set
in WTO, those developing countries would consider levying taxes on
every product exported from developed countries, not only the carbon-
intensity products. This trade war could be very costly, but would not
necessarily enhance the integrity of environmental protection.
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A far more important question to deal with climate change is: how to
meaningfully include substantial participation of developing countries in
the post-Kyoto climate regime, and in which form? The exemption of
developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol has created a “black hole,”
which has crippled the scheme. As GHG emissions are coming from de-
veloping countries in a rapidly growing speed, any climate negotiation
without the participation of leading developing countries like China and
India will fail.
Besides BTAs, developed countries can form joint projects with develop-
ing countries to combat climate change. By cooperating with developing
countries, developed countries can gain more practical and valuable ex-
periences in new industries with better chances of gaining a larger mar-
ket share by participating in the local market early. Under these
circumstances, enterprises from developed countries can be profitable by
opening joint markets with developing countries. In this way, partnership
and joint investment can serve as alternatives to being adversaries.
Before developed countries undertake any measures, it is essential to
think about the ultimate costs and benefits and make sure that there is not
a waste of resources, or that the measures were simply for a game.
The issue with BTAs or other similar trade limitation measures is that
these types of measures will always interlock with the test of equality,
justice and humanity. The CBDR principle should be followed firmly
because it originates from humanity’s tendency to help others with dif-
ferent capacities and it is inherent between citizens and their countries to
want to reach an international cooperation with the possibility of success.
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